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Burbach: The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference andDeterrence Failure in

Japan. In a campaign breathtaking in
its brutality, Japan destroyed China’s
nascent republic, enabled the victory
of the Communists in their civil war
with the Nationalists, and destroyed
the old imperial order in Asia. Thus,
the new China was born into a world
of many possibilities. Unhappily, none
of the good ones, either domestically or internationally, was realized
until 1979, when China’s current
“rise” can be said to have begun.
Westad’s fine account of what has come
before brings us to realize that the rise of
China will not necessarily have a calming effect on either the Chinese people
or on others who live nearby. Since 1750,
“internationalization,” though not entirely a one-way street, has been mostly
that; now, the restless empire, once in a
defensive crouch, is moving out smartly
in all directions. Perhaps this should be
expected of a “civilizational state,” except
that today’s China offers to the world
nothing of what it once did—no high
culture, no attainments in intellectual
and philosophical life, and certainly no
models for wise and effective governance. Instead, as Westad helps us see,
the current regime is thrashing around,
which makes its own future, as well as
the futures both of its “near abroad” and
of the world at large, hard to predict.
Empires, we have been taught, are supposed to bring peace, but today’s Middle
Empire ruled from today’s Beijing
displays many indications that it is bent
on becoming a major disturber of the
peace. Yet even under a more enlightened outlook, there would be challenges: the Middle Empire borders on
three nuclear-weapons states—Russia,
India, and Pakistan—and probably also
a fourth, North Korea. Even so, from
his own well-informed examination of
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China’s modern experience Westad concludes that prospects for peace remain—
not a ringing vote of confidence in the
powers that be in Beijing, but neither is
it a wholly despairing outlook. After all,
Westad is an accomplished historian of
the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedomenhancing outcome of which reminds us
that things do not always turn out badly.
CHARLES HORNER

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Washington, D.C.

Twomey, Christopher P. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in SinoAmerican Relations. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2010. 240pp. $35

It has been said that “weapons speak
to the wise—but in general they need
interpreters.” The Military Lens, written by political scientist Christopher P.
Twomey, associate professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, shows the difficulty of that quote.
Twomey makes a strong case that differing military languages and doctrines
explain otherwise puzzling examples
of deterrence failure and escalation.
The Military Lens is a welcome addition
to the literature on deterrence, which
too often treats actors as interchangeable “black boxes.” Twomey writes in the
spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis,
explore psychological factors that led to
misinterpreting the actions of others.
Twomey’s work adds the new factor of
military doctrine. Every military has
its own doctrine, or “theory of victory,”
its vision of how military resources
are to be used to achieve operational
success. Twomey’s core argument is
that strategists look through a doctrinal “lens” when assessing capabilities
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and intentions and that this weakens
deterrence in two ways: the credibility
of others’ threats is discounted, because
their doctrines are thought to be ineffective, and the others’ signals are missed
by the use of one’s own doctrine as a
template for indicators. This attention to
misperceptions at the level of operational net assessment is new and of direct
relevance to planners and analysts.

strengthened by a larger universe of
cases that may answer such additional
questions as these: Are doctrinal differences more common in ground
than naval warfare, for example? Do
opponents in long-lasting rivalries
(compared to the United States /
People’s Republic of China in 1950)
fare better at assessing the others’
capability despite differing doctrines?

Much of the book tests the author’s
theory against three Korean War–era
episodes: China’s failure to deter U.S.
movement north of the thirty-eighth
parallel, American failure to deter China
from entering the war, and the less wellknown maritime story of how the United
States prevented a planned Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Twomey also traces how
greatly the United States and the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) underestimated
each other’s land warfare capabilities
and as a result issued threats that neither
considered credible. The PLA Navy,
with officers largely educated abroad,
understood that U.S. air supremacy rendered landings impossible. The choice
of the 1950 Korean cases was wise, as
most variables other than PLA army/
navy differences are constant. A notable
feature of the case studies is archival
research, both in the United States and
in China; fresh documentation alone
will appeal to Korean War specialists.

The Military Lens offers a warning that
clear, credible threats may not be understood as such by others. Since doctrinal
misperceptions take place at the military
level, the lessons here are particularly
relevant to planners, as they develop
assessments and deterrent options for
civilian leaders. This work also holds
implications for professional military
education, stating as it does that officers
should be encouraged to overcome doctrinal filters, that scholars should study
foreign doctrines, and that educational
exchanges might reduce misunderstandings (the author himself is involved
in U.S.-Chinese dialogues). Perhaps
weapons speak a common tongue, but
Twomey reminds us that militaries need
to be fluent in multiple languages.

Doctrinal difference fits the Korean
War, but the radical divergence of the
revolutionary PLA and atomic American
military makes this a relatively easy case,
as Twomey acknowledges. How often
do doctrinal differences generally lead
to deterrence failures? An additional
chapter on two Arab-Israeli cases argues
that deterrence failure is correlated with
doctrinal divergence. The evidence
is suggestive, but the book could be
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Kane, Tim. Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military
Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for
a Revolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012. 271pp. $27

This book provides a critical analysis
and highlights a dysfunctional U.S.
Army officer personnel management
system. The author explains why the
best and brightest young officers depart
early for civilian careers and what can be
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